Unemployment, intertwined with poverty, now poses a huge threat to both social stability and the rule of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) that demands an urgent human resources policy response. This paper begins with an examination of the issues of employment and unemployment in China, then moves on to explain the institutional changes that brought about the problem. Shanghai will be taken as a case study to explore the policy responses. A labour market model will be developed as a theoretical tool to discuss both active and passive labour market programmes in Shanghai. Despite the apparent success of the Shanghai model, its general applicability to other cities remains uncertain, particularly in view of China's entry to the World Trade Organization.
INTRODUCTION
The management of human resources -broadly conceived -in the People's Republic of China (henceforth to be referred to as China) had been associated with a Soviet-style command economy and lifetime employment from 1949, when Mao Zedong took power, until 1978 when Deng Xiaoping's economic reforms were initially launched.
The Chinese worker in the 1950s saw the implementation of a 'jobs for life' and 'cradle to the grave' welfare policy, for those working in the urban industrial state-owned enterprises (SOEs, for short). This system was widely known in Chinese parlance as the 'iron rice bowl' (tie fan wan) and became a widely used short-hand term for the management status quo amongst informed outsiders interested in what is happening in that country (see Child, 1994) .
The system was partly derived from earlier Chinese Communist experience in the so-called 'liberated zones' during the war with Japan, as well as later, Soviet practice, but in addition may have had roots in Japanese precedents in Occupied Manchuria. It is likely that there were a wide range of earlier influences that had shaped the evolution of the 'iron rice-bowl', but it had become definitively embedded in industrial life and fully institutionalised by the mid1950s. Labour market imbalances were to be addressed at the company level rather than in the open market. Like the Japanese labour-market policy model, the emphasis was on the 'internal' labour market within the enterprise as opposed to the 'external' labour market outside the enterprise. It is an enterprise centred and industry driven form of labour market management. In this context, labour market policies may be considered as social protection, both in theory and in practice and intended as a form of employment protection (Abrahart and Verme, 2001:60) . Several writers (Walder, 1986; Warner, 1995) have seen the 'iron rice-bowl' relationship as 'organizational dependency', and as an important theoretical support for their analysis, to which we will return later. The 'mind-sets' associated with this relationship became deep-rooted and difficult to modify or change. Even so, with the beginnings of the economic reforms, the guarantees of the 'iron rice-bowl' began to be eroded. 5 But this only came about gradually in the reform period. The policy of jobs for life lingered on in the 1980s but it was not until the 1990s that the 'iron rice bowl' began to be effectively replaced by a market-oriented set of labour and personnel reforms. The 'life-time' employment system was generally believed by economics and management scholars to be associated with weak people-management and to reinforce factor-immobility and inefficiency (see Warner 1995; 2000 , on the background literature on this). Government acknowledged the existence of unemployment as a necessary temporary condition to facilitate and maximize allocation of labour. Government's role has become mainly to support the unemployed with income maintenance and training schemes so as to facilitate job seeking and placement. Managers were now allowed more autonomy, particularly in SOEs to hire and fire; decision-making was to become more decentralized in not only personnel but also marketing and purchasing domains. A reform-inspired workplace practice adopted from the mid 1980s onwards had been the implementation of 'labour contracts'. By defining the length of the contract, the period of employment became sharply defined and hence displaced the previously enshrined practice of permanent 'life-time employment'. In theory, workers in the People's Republic had since the 1950s been the 'masters of the country' (guojia zhuren), the bad old days of job insecurity a bygone feature and by definition unemployment could not exist. The key question of the day was the 'right to work' (gongzuo quan) and 'full employment' (quanmin jiuye).
Unemployment sanitized in the phrase 'waiting for work' (daiye), in turn intertwined with poverty, however now poses such a major threat to both social stability and the rule of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) that it demands an urgent policy response. This article begins with an examination of the issue of employment and unemployment in China in the first section, then moves on to explain the institutional changes that brought about the problem in the second section. We then discuss our research methodology. Shanghai will be taken as a 'case study' to explore policy responses; then, a labour market model will be developed, in the next section, to discuss both active and passive labour market programmes in Shanghai.
Despite the apparent success of the Shanghai model, its general applicability to other cities remains uncertain, particularly in view of China's entry to the World Trade Organization, the subject of the discussion section that follows. Finally, the last section presents some 6 conclusions.
EMPLOYMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT IN CHINA
At the present time, China's billion and a quarter population and vast labour-force, the largest in the world (see Warner, 1995) puts human resources high on the agenda as far as the recent WTO entry in late December 2001, is concerned. Much of the labour force of over 700 million are country-dwellers and still live in townships and villages. There has been until lately a strict 'one-child policy' in most of the People's Republic to restrain population numbers, as new citizens as well as existing ones have to be fed, housed and employed, no easy challenge. Half the labour-force work on the land but it is estimated over 200 million of these are surplus to economic requirements and already over 100 million are already on the move making their way into the towns, as part of the 'floating' migrant population known as the mingong. Over one-third of China's population live in urban areas. Those out of work in the towns were in the late 1990s officially calculated at 3.5 percent of the urban workforce but in reality this could be much higher as we shall shortly see.
Shanghai, which is China's largest city, was no exception. Unemployment was officially unknown throughout the Maoist years. Jobs for life were de rigueur. The unemploymentrate in Shanghai even by 2001was officially seen as low as 4.3 per cent in spite of the industrial restructuring that had taken place in that conurbation (Shanghai Statistical Yearbook, 2002) . It is more than likely to be an underestimate. As Solinger has rightly pointed out, "accurate data are hard to come by, since government statistics are murky and often presented in a way that suggest that the numbers are not all that large" (Solinger, 2002: 304) . The State Council's Development Research Centre issued a report that contradicts official figures for the current unemployment rate. In contrast to the very recent official rate of 4.5 per cent in China, the report indicates that the urban unemployment rate is already 10 per cent, and will rise to 15 per cent under the impact of World Trade Organization entry. Politics has plagued the use of statistics from the beginning of the People's Republic. So long as high GDP growth rates and low unemployment are treated as political targets, and are 7 used to bolster the careers of provincial officials, then these problems will remain. One phrase that is commonly heard among Chinese economists is that 'statistics make the officials and officials make up the statistics' (shuju chengjiu guanyuan, guanyuan chengjiu shuju).
Euphemisms abound in this sphere; here are a few examples (See Kynge, 2003) .
• daiye, waiting for work;
• fenliu, attached to one unit but working or another;
• neitui, retired early but getting a stipend;
• tingxin liuzhi, keeping a job but without pay;
• liangbuzhao, similar but with more emphasis;
• fang changjia, on a long vacation;
• tiqian tuixui, early retirement;
• fuyu renyuan, no work but a token wage.
Indeed, caution has to be paid to differences in definitions. China defines the jobless in a Maurer-Fazio's (2002) empirical analysis that demonstrates that education has become a key determinant of labour market outcomes in China's rapidly changing work environment. Educational attainment is now an important factor in the 'lay-off decision' -the more education a worker has, the better his/her protection from lay off. Similarly, the more education a worker has, the better his/her chances of finding new employment.
Wang openly acknowledged that China was facing a severe condition of employment, and the number that newly joined the labour force was at an unprecedented peak. In the coming few years, 12 to 13 million will enter the labour market per year. Even if China retains its current 7 per cent economic growth per year, only 8 million jobs will be created. This means the annual newly added unemployed will be 4 to 5 million. By the end of 2005, a 20 million new unemployed force will appear. Whereas the precise total aggregates may be in doubt, this description seems plausible. Unemployment, intertwined with poverty, now poses a huge threat to both social stability and the rule of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) that demands an urgent policy response. Labour-market programmes have emerged as an important employment-policy tool since the reform era. The following section examines the institutional changes in the Chinese labour market in the pre and post-reform era. Hussain, Stern and Stiglitz (2000) argued most persuasively, in their theoretical analysis of the recent economic reform process, that China's more successful transformation has been based on 'a process of institutional change that preserved and built on its basic codes and practices of behaviour' (p.4). Table 1 shows a comparison of the institutional changes in the pre and post-reform era. China's pre-reform labour system was the antithesis of the free market. The state claimed ownership of labour services and bureaucratically assigned workers to enterprises for life (tongyi fenpei). Workers' preferences concerning occupation or location mattered little. On the enterprise side, managers for the most part had to accept any and all workers allocated to them. Job mobility was minimal and would occur mostly as the result of workers' reassignments or transfers to satisfy the need of state-run organizations (Walder, 1986:8) .
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INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES IN THE CHINESE LABOUR MARKET
Under these circumstances, where individuals are discouraged from searching for jobs, information about jobs is unimportant and meaningless.
Around 1992 and 1993, the policy of state job assignment was largely abolished. By the mid-1990s, the tongyi fenpei system remained only in a residual manner in large cities such as Shanghai (Davis, 1999:22-43) . School graduates still have access to state-sponsored channels for employment, but they now have the option of using market channels such as 10 advertisements, job fairs, and employment agencies. The number of private enterprises, foreign-funded firms, and other non-state controlled businesses has significantly increased.
Seen positively, the operation of labour markets made it legitimate for individuals to use all kinds of channels to search for jobs. Bian's (2002) study of job mobility in five Chinese cities indicated that from the pre-reform period to the 1980-92 and the post-1992 period, job mobility through hierarchical channels ii declined sharply from 76 per cent to 52 per cent to 10 per cent respectively. Meanwhile, job mobility through market channels increased from 15 per cent to 32 per cent to 60 per cent respectively. These changes point to the decline of job assignments and the growth of labour markets in Chinese cities from 1980 to 1999 (Bian, 2002:4-7) .
On the other hand, the abolition of the state allocation system also means that concerns about state-sector inefficiency began to override concerns about dismissals and layoffs. Enterprise reforms replaced the 'iron rice bowl' with performance-based hiring, firing, and compensation. State-owned enterprises have begun to use labour contracts, adopt wage reform, and decentralize labour management. The policy of putting workers on xiagang was first experimented with and then applied nation-wide in 1997. The effects were profound.
The security once enjoyed by urban workers rapidly eroded. Chinese urban workers are no longer shielded from market forces. They bear the brunt of the adjustment costs as enterprises shed redundant workers in their attempts to become more efficient and profitable.
Laid-off workers experience substantial periods of unemployment with minimal stipends. To address this issue, various localities have devised their own 're-employment projects'
(zaijiuye gongcheng). Shanghai was chosen for our study because it was the pioneer in establishing the Re-employment Service Centre. Combining welfare provision, employment service and re-training programme, the Shanghai Re-employment Service Centre was recognized by the central government as a 'learning model' for other local governments.
These changes exemplify the notion that state institutions constantly readjust and revise themselves in response to new demands and circumstances -an important feature of the transitional economy (Solinger, 1999 cited in Fan, 2002 . We now turn to briefly sketch out the research approach we used in the case study.
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RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The main research methods we used, in the citywide case study presented here, draw on evidence gleaned mainly from both primary and secondary documents, media reports and official statistics; these we consistently approached with caution, for an analysis and iii The evidence we present below, we believe, has therefore robust empirical underpinnings. Figure 1 depicts a labour market model that summarizes the operation of the system in Shanghai. Over the past 40 years, 'active' labour-market programmes have emerged as an important employment-policy tool, particularly in developed countries. This policy envelope includes a wide range of activities, intended to increase the quality of labour-supply (for example, re-training); to increase labour demand (for example, direct job-creation); or to improve the matching of workers and jobs (for example, job-search assistance). The objective of these measures is primarily economic -to increase the probability that the unemployed will find jobs or that the underemployed will increase their productivity and earnings. However, more recently the case for active labour-market policies has also emphasised the potential social benefits in t he form of the inclusion and participation that comes from productive employment (Betcherman, Dar, Luinstra, Ogawa, 2000: 1) . In the analysis we develop here, we use the labour market theoretical framework we have referred 12 to above, albeit with minor modifications and a number of caveats.
THE SHANGHAI LABOUR MARKET MODEL
Labour supply (school leavers, job changers and laid-off workers) is the primary input to the systems model. It is hopeful that this supply of labour will be transformed by the active labour market programmes of the government leading to positive output of employment. This policy envelope includes a wide range of activities, intended to increase the quality of labour-supply (for example, re-training); to increase labour demand (for example, direct job-creation); or to improve the matching of workers and jobs (for example, job-search assistance). The objective of these measures is primarily economic -to increase the probability that the unemployed will find jobs or that the underemployed will increase their productivity and earnings. Shanghai has also established a 'passive' labour market policy of unemployment insurance. training differs from job to job: domestic helpers will be trained for three weeks, six hours a day; cooks and technicians will receive training for half a year, but three days a week.
According to the head of the training-centre visited, the success-rate in job placement is often boosted from the normal rate of below 30 per cent to as high as 70 per cent for domestic helpers (Field interviews, June 1999). In Shanghai, re-training is free of charge for job seekers certified to be xiagang workers and unemployed. Some laid-off workers do benefit from various training programmes, ranging from cooking and hairdressing to public relations, law and marketing ( China Daily, 30 January 2001) . However, if training is for selfdevelopment purpose, each trainee will have to pay 300 yuan for joining the course.
Creation of Employment
In general, job-creation programmes across the world are designed to support the creation of new jobs or the maintenance of existing ones. Three broad types of programmes fall under this category. First, there are subsidies to encourage employers to hire new workers or to keep employees who might otherwise have been 'laid-off' for business reasons. These can take the form of direct wage-subsidies (for either the employer or worker) or social security payment offsets. These types of subsidies are always targeted to a particular category of worker or employer. The second category involves direct job-creation in the public or 15 non-profit sector through public works or related programmes. Typically, government funds used for these programmes cover compensation costs to hire previously unemployed workers, usually on a temporary basis. Third, support is sometimes offered to unemployed workers to start their own enterprises (Betcherman, Dar, Luinstra, Ogawa, 2000: 6) .
Direct public employment-creation policies are set up to lessen unemployment by creating jobs and hiring the unemployed directly. It targets the displaced and the long-term unemployed, with a view to help they regain contact with the labour market, thereby minimising the probability of stigmatisation, skills obsolescence, and marginalisation. A major Apart from displaying job vacancies, information on re-training is also available on the Internet, not necessarily of much use to the poor, except at official agency centres. Retraining courses are designed, financed and delivered by the government. According to the Deputy Head of the Shanghai Re-employment Service Centre, the contents of these training programmes are intended to link to the needs of the market. Among the ten positions advertised to be in greatest demand for workers every week in the local newspapers, training programmes will be offered for the first four ranks. Examples of such vacancies include cashiers, computer technicians, cooks, domestic helpers, and electrical technicians. The training centres are attached to the placement centres. Upon completion of training, the trainees will be referred to jobs.
Active labour market measures are now in place in many new directions. Placement officers, for example, provide counselling to job seekers on labour-market information, and reeducate those who possess the 'iron rice-bowl' mentality to change. To establish rapport between the counsellor and his or her client, individual counsellors will follow through cases.
All counsellors are trained and are required to pass a professional examination annually.
Overseas training in Germany has been arranged for outstanding counsellors. The State closely monitors the situation of workers who have been 'disassociated' from the State enterprises. The hardship cases are entitled to a subsistence allowance (zuidi shenghui butei) of 297 yuan per month when repeated referrals, counselling, and re-training do not work. Unlike the European model that provides generous unemployment support meant for adequate income maintenance, the Chinese government is extremely careful to balance between stringent procedures and social stability. In any case, subsistence allowance is only payable for two years, after which the unemployed will only be entitled to a maximum unemployment insurance of 432 yuan per month depending on various factors like age, and years of contribution to unemployment insurance (see Table 2 ). 
DISCUSSION AND EVALUATION
As a 'transitional' mechanism to manage unemployment in industrial China, particularly as it manifests in the phenomenon of laid-off workers, the Re-employment Service Centre may be seen as a possibly viable institutional bridge between work-unit and society relating to the wider societal management of human resources, both in theoretical as well as empirical terms.
It is clearly, in our view, a compromise between the protection of the work unit (danwei) system and the harsh course of simply pushing the responsibility for the unemployed onto the wider society. This mechanism is different from both the past practice of the Communist planned economy, where surplus workers were resettled by the enterprises, on the one hand and from the American liberal, market-driven labour market management system practice of just 'dumping' such workers onto society, on the other.
However, the more or less relative success of this programme in Shanghai does not necessarily mean that it would also succeed if implemented nationwide. It is because the rapid growth of the Shanghai economy helps to create jobs and ease pressure on employment. vi Indeed, Shanghai has been one of the fastest growing areas in China. Its economy outgrew the national average in the last decade or so (see Figure 2 ). Provided that the pace of economic development is different among various regions, it is not surprising that the establishment of Re-employment Service Centres in some cities does not have the same achievements as that of Shanghai or other affluent coastal cities. One indication is that the re-employment rate of Shanghai is much higher than that of the figure in the whole country (see Figure 3) . 
CONCLUDING REMARKS
In relatively well-off Shanghai, the re-employment centres do provide a 'safety-net' for the xiagang workers as the minimum living protection of laid-off workers provided by the Reemployment Service Centres has been merged gradually with the unemployment insurance system. However, the types and quality of services provided by the centres in different localities do vary considerably. In some centres, on the other hand, there are also cases where the centres fail to provide any assistance. For instance, some centres in Wuhan merely provide a form for the entrants to fill out but have virtually nothing more to offer. A desperate worker thus received no money, no training, no placement, and heard nothing from his centre after he had signed a contract with the centre for 18 months, it was reported (Solinger, 2001: 683) . Such problems often provoke protests and demonstrations: for example, 30, 000
workers from 20 bankrupt factories marched in the streets in Liaoyang in the north-eastern 22 'rust-belt', in March 2002 (see Becker, 2003 . The regime gravely fears a cloning of the Polish-style 'Solidarity' movement -a reason why Deng had earlier tried to increase worker involvement in enterprise decision making at the beginning of the reform process in the early 1980s.
Moreover, officials from the Ministry of Labour and Social Security had warned that the chances for the xiagang workers to get re-employment might deteriorate in the years to come. Statistics from the Ministry show that about 23 million labourers will be seeking jobs in urban areas in the next three to four years since 2002, but there are only expected to be about 8 million job opportunities available (China Daily, 24 September 2002) . In the first half of the year 2001, among those 7.69 million xiagang state workers, the official statistics concede that only 11.1 percent of the total had succeeded in finding new jobs. This proportion was 4.9 percentage points lower than that of the same period in the previous year will still be vexing the Chinese government in the foreseeable future (see Becker, 2003) and may likely still constitute a potential threat to social stability.
The system can probably only maintain its status quo if there are more 'winners' than 'losers' (see Warner, 2002) . The rate of economic growth must keep growing at a rate above eight percent per annum just to absorb the redundant old and job-seeking youth. If China can continue its almost unprecedented rapid economic expansion, it might just keep matters under control. Otherwise the system will prove to be unstable and the future unpredictable.
